Abstract. We study the optimal location of a waste facility in a horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly where …rms choose their location and price. The policymaker decides the location of a waste facility targeting social welfare maximization. Consistent with the observation of the location decisions of waste facilities in Portugal, we show that the optimal location of a waste facility is never in the city center under partial ex-post regulation. Ex-ante regulation ensures the highest level of social welfare, but from a theoretical point of view, it requires a waste facility located in the city center. A robustness check is then provided to justify that, in actual regulatory practice, a …rst-mover regulator maximizes social welfare without necessarily imposing the installation of a waste facility in the city center.
Introduction
Waste production results from the use of resources in socioeconomic activities. Regarding its origin, waste has several classi…cations. This research focuses on municipal solid waste (MSW).
1 Households, industries and services are the main sources of MSW. To ensure the treatment of waste, …rms must incur in additional costs to transport it into adequate facilities or waste collection points. In turn, consumers also incur transportation costs traveling from their homes to where …rms are located to purchase products. Given the simultaneous presence of two distinct costs, a waste regulator may target various objectives such as allocative e¢ ciency, minimization of transportation costs and environmental protection. This means that …rms and waste regulator are subject to several trade-o¤s. Although …rms may have the incentive to be located within a residential area to more easily attract consumers, they are also expected to be environmentally committed which requires, for instance, avoiding dumping and land…lling. From an economic point of view, the waste regulator may have the incentive to support the implementation of a waste collection point within a residential area. However, from an environmental and social standpoint, the perverse e¤ect emerging from the implementation of a waste collection point in that area should not be disregarded. Consequently, the determination of the optimal location of a waste collection point seems to be a critical issue a¤ecting any jurisdiction. In the European Union (EU), it is estimated that a more e¢ cient management of MSW would save 1:4 billion euros of annual imports and would generate 1:6 billion euros in revenues (COM 571 Final 2011) . In Portugal, the amount of MSW produced was 4:8 million tonnes in 2012 corresponding to 15% of total national waste. Of these, 12% was referred for multimaterial recovery, 16% for organic recycling, 18% for energy recovery and 54% was sent directly to land…ll (APA 2013) . Subsequently, an improper management of MSW determines signi…cant environmental costs. The deposition of MSW in Portuguese land…ll soils originated greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of 2:8 million tonnes of CO 2 in 2011 corresponding to 34:1% of waste sector emissions and 4:0% of total national GHG emissions (APA 2013) .
In a recent article, Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) use spatial competition to study a High Municipal Solid Waste Management System (HIGH MSWMS) within the linear city model of Hotelling (1929) . They investigate a duopoly in the linear city and describe the strategic behavior of producers when the regulator pre-selects the location of a waste collection point. Two different systems are analyzed: a producer-pay-regime (PPR) where the regulator requires …rms to pay waste transportation costs, and a consumer-pay-regime (CPR) where the regulator requires consumers to pay waste transportation costs. In a PPR system, Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) conclude that the waste collection point is always located in the city center. Vitoria-Gasteiz, a city in the north of Spain, is provided as real example where a waste facility located in the city center is observed. They also show that, only in a CPR system under sequential location decision, the waste collection point is biased from the city center. When that is the case, the waste collection point turns to occupy a location closer to the …rm with higher market share.
An important and realistic mechanism that may change the location of a waste collection point in a PPR system, not captured in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) , is a setting in which one of the producers is able to select its location before the regulatory decision on the location of the waste collection point. This may occur either explicitly due to the fact that the producer may already be operating before the introduction of waste regulation or implicitly because the producer may anticipate the regulatory decision on where the waste collection point is installed.
2 Assuming that …rm A (B) is the leader (follower, respectively) …rm in location choice, this means that Bárcena-Ruiz and CasadoIzaga (2015) analyze the case of ex-ante regulation (i.e., the regulator decides the optimal location of the waste collection point before both …rms choose the respective locations sequentially), while we focus on the case of partial ex-post regulation (i.e., the regulator decides the optimal location of the waste collection point after the location decision of …rm A, but before the location decision of …rm B). Thus, the goal of this study is twofold. From the theoretical standpoint, we want to con…rm if the result of Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) applied to a PPR system is su¢ ciently general. In particular, does the transition from ex-ante regulation to partial ex-post regulation modi…es the optimal location of a waste collection point? From the practical standpoint, once taking into account that consumers and producers bear transportation costs, we intend to understand which type of regulatory regime ensures social welfare maximization. To meet our objectives, we develop a mathematical framework to analyze the role of a HIGH MSWMS. Although conceptually simple, the linear city is a very powerful and widely adopted model in a wide range of areas, including environmental economics.
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The main …ndings are summarized as follows. Firstly, we …nd that the centripetal mechanism described in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) is distorted once changing the timing structure of the game because, despite the centripetal force pushes …rms towards the waste collection point, this is no longer located in the city center. If one of the producers commits to a location before the location decision of the waste facility in a PPR system, the optimal location of the waste collection point is never in the city center. This equilibrium result is consistent with the location decisions of waste collection points in Portugal, which is a country characterized by partial ex-post regulation.
Secondly, we compare the equilibrium level of social welfare under ex-ante regulation with the equilibrium level of social welfare under partial ex-post regulation to conclude that social welfare is unambiguously harmed with the transition from ex-ante regulation to partial ex-post regulation. When the relative transportation cost of consumers is su¢ ciently low, the reduction of social welfare corresponds to the decrease in consumer surplus plus the decrease in producer surplus. When the relative transportation cost of consumers is suf…ciently high, the reduction of social welfare corresponds to the reduction of consumer surplus created by the increase in consumers'transportation cost.
This result implies a trade-o¤ in waste regulatory policy because Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) show that the optimal location of a waste facility under ex-ante regulation is the city center, but this equilibrium location is rarely observable in reality. We then provide a robustness check to justify that the waste regulator surpasses the trade-o¤ in real practice, which is tantamount to saying that social welfare can be maximized through the adoption of ex-ante regulation, but without necessarily imposing the city center as the optimal location of the waste facility. This process is developed in two separate steps. First, we highlight the presence of a direct e¤ect under ex-ante regulation that discourages the persistence of a waste facility in the city center. This requires to clarify additional factors forcing the location of the waste facility to alternative places (e.g., peripheral regions) other than the city center under ex-ante regulation. Second, we emphasize the presence of an indirect e¤ect under partial ex-post regulation that reinforces the persistence of a waste facility in a biased location relative to the city center. This requires to con…rm that the distortion in the optimal location of the waste facility veri…ed under partial ex-post regulation is resilient or, similarly, that it remains qualitatively valid when the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent types of waste facilities is taken into account. If that is the case, the biased location is not in ‡uenced by the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent waste facilities, thereby making less likely the presence of a waste facility in the city center when the regulatory regime moves towards ex-ante regulation. 4 Needless to say, we …nd evidence in favor of this conjecture in the case of the Portuguese HIGH MSWMS. Since the biased location of the waste facility under partial ex-post regulation holds generality, its pass through is expected to occur when the regulatory regime moves towards ex-ante regulation. Therefore, the main policy implication from our analysis is the need to consider not only …rms'strategic location decisions, but also alternative factors when deciding the optimal location of waste facilities. 4 From a dynamic point of view, some …rms with high maturity may disappear whereas new startups may emerge in a given regional jurisdiction, thereby justifying the transition from partial ex-post regulation to ex-ante regulation. From a static point of view, distinct regulatory regimes may be applied to di¤erent waste facilities, that is, either ex-ante regulation or partial ex-post regulation can be applied to di¤erent waste facilities, namely if there is heterogeneity between di¤erent waste collection points either due to the installation of waste facilities in di¤erent regional jurisdictions or due to the fact that a given waste collection point may be located closer to the city center relatively to others being, therefore, subject to tighter regulation.
Municipal solid waste management systems in Portugal
The purpose of this section is twofold. Firstly, motivate the assumptions of our model by focusing on the Portuguese HIGH MSWMS and, thenceforward, clarify that Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) are modeling an exception rather than the rule in relation to the optimal location of a waste collection point in a PPR system. The Portuguese MSWMS is organized in two levels or categories. On the one hand, there is a municipal solid waste management category of urban services provided to other management entities, i.e. the HIGH MSWMS. At this macro level, which corresponds to the focus of this research, municipal solid waste costs are paid only by …rms constituting, therefore, a PPR system. On the other hand, there is a water and municipal solid waste management category of urban services provided to end users, i.e. the LOW MSWMS. At this micro level, …rms and consumers pay waste management costs constituting, therefore, a hybrid consumer-and-producer-pay-regime system. However, even within this category, the Portuguese National Regulatory Authority for Water and Waste Services (ERSAR) documents that …rms' activities are the most relevant contributors to the aggregate tax revenue.
5 Table I describes di¤erent types of waste collection points per HIGH MSWMS in Portugal. Nowadays, there are 23 HIGH MSWMS in Portugal, being 12 multimunicipal and 11 intermunicipal. 6 The Portuguese HIGH MSWMS are characterized by market discrepancy with respect to the number of municipalities that comprise, area and population covered and socioeconomic conditions of the population served (APA 2013). Moreover, each Portuguese HIGH MSWMS has di¤erent waste infrastructures, namely land…lls (L), sorting centers (SC), transfer centers (TC), ecocenters (EC), ecopoints (EP), energy recovery centers (ERC), organic recovery centers (ORC) and mechanical biologic treatment stations (MBT). In 2012, 34 land…lls, 29 sorting centers, 81 transfer centers, 190 ecocenters, 37971 ecopoints, 2 energy recovery centers, 11 organic recovery fa-cilities and 7 MBT stations compose the total number of waste collection points in Portugal. Source: APA (2013) and ERSAR (2014) As explained in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015), "(...) we consider just a waste collection point and not a land…ll as a land…ll generates negative externalities and because of these e¤ects it would be located outside the residential area". Hence, we disregard land…lls in addition to ecocenters and ecopoints due to their reduced dimension to ensure that both studies are aligned and, consequently, we only focus on large sanitary waste facilities. It is now important to stress out that none of the relevant waste facilities is located in the middle of a Portuguese city. Moreover, some regional jurisdictions already had …rms operating before the construction of the respective waste facility and the Portuguese legislation establishes that producers are the entities responsible to pay waste management costs.
7 Summarizing, simple observation of the Portuguese HIGH MSWMS indicates that Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) are modeling an exception rather than the rule in terms of the optimal location of a waste facility in a PPR system. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 presents the model. Section 4 describes the main results. Section 5 compares our results with those of Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) . A robustness check is exposed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
Model
Consider a duopoly with horizontally di¤erentiated …rms dealing with two types of decision: short-term (i.e., price) and long-term (i.e., location). The goal is to con…rm the following claim.
Claim 1. In a PPR system, the location of a waste collection point is not restricted to the center of a city.
On the demand side of the market, an unitary density of consumers is uniformly distributed along the interval [0; 1].
9 Consumers inelastically demand one unit of product and incur a quadratic transportation cost relatively to distance td 2 , where t measures the transportation cost of consumers per unit of distance, 10 t > 0 and d 2 is the squared distance travelled by a single consumer from its home (x) to one of the two possible locations (a if attending to …rm A or b if attending to …rm B, respectively). Each consumer derives surplus from consumption, gross of price and transportation cost, denoted by v which is assumed su¢ ciently large to ensure full market coverage.
On the supply side of the market, two producers indexed by i, i = fA; Bg, are respectively located at a and b, fa; bg 2 R. Note that a < b [ a > b holds, June 2011. The exception occurs in the management of municipal waste whose daily output does not exceed 1100 liters per producer. Transcribing this to the Portuguese classi…cation of MSWMS, HIGH MSWMS are responsible to daily outputs exceeding 1100 liters per producer, ensured inside and outside municipalities and constituting a PPR. LOW MSWMS are responsible to daily outputs not exceeding 1100 liters per producer, ensured inside communities by waste removing municipal …rms. As a result, Portugal constitutes a good proxy to support our research. On one hand, it constitutes an adequate case-study where a PPR system has been implemented. On the other hand, none of large waste collection points is located in the center of a city.
8 For the sake of brevity, we relegate to the Online Appendix the formal analysis of the PPR system and respective proofs, we present additional factors in favor of the implementation of waste collection points in peripheral zones under ex-ante regulation and expose the statistical exercise con…rming that the equilibrium location of the waste facility under partial ex-post regulation is resilient to the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent HIGH MSWMS in Portugal. 9 This interval corresponds to the ex-ante product space of characteristics occupied by consumers. Alternatively, in the traditional sense of location theory, it can be interpreted as the residential area of consumers.
1 0 Variable t introduces product di¤erentiation in one dimension: distance between consumers' location and …rms' location. This distance is materialized in transportation costs incurred by consumers that can be direct (e.g., fuel cost, bus ticket) and/or indirect (e.g., time required to travel). Hence, t can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the degree of market competitiveness such that the lower t is, the …ercer is competition between …rms.
i.e. leader A chooses location a and then follower B chooses location b that may be at the right or at the left of A's location. Locations a and b measure the distance of both …rms from the left endpoint of the city.
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In what follows, let us present the model for a < b. Nevertheless, a simple relabeling allows to describe demands, pro…ts and surpluses for b < a. Assume that, once each …rm chooses the respective location, this cannot be changed in the future. Both …rms produce the same identical good, di¤erentiated in the eyes of consumers by the location and price of producers.
The indirect utility of a generic consumer located at x 2 [0; 1] choosing to buy from A is given by
while the indirect utility of the same consumer choosing to buy from B is given by
where p i 0 is the price of …rm i. Without loss of generality, we normalize …rms'marginal cost to zero.
Following Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) assume that the waste collection point is located at r 2 R. Moreover, assume that the production of the good involves the generation of waste that must be transported from each …rm to the waste collection point. Consequently, if a …rm is located at a positive distance from the location of the waste collection point, then the …rm will incur in waste transportation costs. The waste transportation costs are quadratic with respect to the distance travelled from each …rm to the waste collection point and proportional to the amount of market share. Formally, the waste transportation cost of …rm A and B is given by
where g represents the positive cost or e¤ort of waste transportation assumed to be equal between …rms, g > 0.
12 The location of the indi¤erent consumer is given by
1 1 In contrast, Hotelling (1929) and the vast majority of related frameworks consider that locations a and b measure the distance of …rms from the left and right endpoints of the city, respectively.
1 2 High g means that the amount of waste generated per unit of good produced is very costly, which implies higher e¤ort on …rms' side once transporting this kind of waste to the collection point (e.g., in ‡ammable waste, hazardous waste). Low g or, in limit, g ! 0 means that transporting the waste is not too costly or, in limit, free (e.g., lower transportion e¤ort is applied to biodegradable waste). Moreover, g can be interpreted as the time spent by …rms on waste disposal. This variable represents an inverse measure of the degree of market competitiveness such that the lower g is, the …ercer is competition between …rms.
Consumers located to the left of e x prefer to buy from A, while consumers located to the right of e x prefer to buy from B. Demands are then given by
1; e x > 1; e x(p B ; p A ; b; a); 0 e x 1;
0; e x < 0;
and
0; e x > 1;
1 e x(p B ; p A ; b; a); 0 e x 1;
1; e x < 0:
The pro…t of …rm i is given by
Consumer surplus (CS) is given by
where e x is the location of the indi¤erent consumer between buying from A or B. The regulator de…nes the location r of the waste collection point targeting social welfare maximization. Social welfare (W ) consists in the sum of producer surplus and consumer surplus
Social welfare does not depend on prices since these correspond to a mere transfer from consumers to producers. The timing structure of the game is motivated by the arguments exposed in Section 2 and given as follows. In the …rst stage, leader A chooses location a to maximize A . In the second stage, regulator R decides location r of the waste collection point to maximize W or, similarly by duality, to minimize total transportation costs (TTC). In the third stage, follower B decides location b to maximize B . In the last stage, both …rms engage in price competition. The game is solved through the backward induction method.
Analysis

Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
After solving the game, the presence of two 'symmetrically asymmetric'equilibria is veri…ed depending on whether a < b or b < a is assumed. For ease of exposition, we do not present both location equilibria in the main text since these correspond to mirror images of each other. In what follows, let us focus on the equilibrium holding for a < b. Proposition 1. Let fa; bg 2 R, ft; gg 2 R + and a < b: The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) with partial ex-post regulation is described as follows.
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t g 2 0; 5 27 :
(a ; b ; r ) = 7 6 11t 3(g + t)
; 
; +1 :
(a ; b ; r ) = 1 2 + g 9(g + t)
; 3 2 8g 9(g + t)
; 11 18 ;
Proof. Consult the Online Appendix.
To maintain consistency in the terminology throughout the manuscript, let us designate the transportation cost of consumers t as transportation cost or product di¤erentiation and the transportation cost of …rms g as waste cost. The strategic interpretation of the model is explained by three main e¤ects: demand or market size e¤ect pushes both …rms towards the city center due to the expectation of increasing membership through the reduction of consumers' transportation cost; price or competitive e¤ect induces each …rm to locate further away from the rival to soften price competition; waste cost reducing e¤ect induces both …rms to locate next to the waste collection point to obtain cost savings. The …rst two strategic e¤ects are standard in linear city models. The third one re ‡ects that an increase in waste cost implies a reduction of productive e¢ ciency or, similarly, an increase in cost ine¢ ciency. Consequently, both …rms may have the incentive to reduce the waste cost by moving towards the location of the waste facility under speci…c circumstances.
Proposition 1 highlights two facts. First, the waste cost reducing e¤ect is referred as a centripetal e¤ect in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) . This e¤ect, however, is no longer centripetal in our game given that the waste collection point is located between …rms' locations but never in the city center, thereby implying that Claim 1 cannot be rejected. Second, the leader faces tougher competitive pressure for a su¢ ciently strong relative sensitivity of consumers towards product di¤erentiation, i.e. the greater is t=g. When both …rms are predominantly concerned on …ghting for additional revenue rather than ensuring cost savings only the follower can internalize the location of the waste collection point, which allows it to take advantage of the observed information to skimp on the cost structure. The regulator is second-mover rather than …rst-mover, however, despite being in ‡uenced by the …rm A's location decision, the regulatory decision also takes into account consumer preferences and future strategic interaction. Although follower B is able to e¤ectively reply to the leader's location by internalizing the waste cost reducing e¤ect, the standard Stackelberg outcome unambiguously holds in equilibrium such that the leader …rm charges higher price, holds larger market share and obtains greater pro…t than the follower …rm:
Comparative statics
Let us explain the variability of the equilibrium locations, prices, market shares, pro…ts, consumer surplus and social welfare in the domain of the relative transportation cost of consumers, t=g. Before that, we should interpret the meaning of this variable. This ratio corresponds to the transportation cost per unit of distance incurred by consumers in relation to the transportation cost per unit of distance incurred by …rms. In the di¤erentiation perspective, t=g below (above) one means that consumers'sensitivity towards product di¤eren-tiation is lower (higher, respectively) than …rms'sensitivity towards waste cost. In the physical or material perspective, t=g below (above) one means that the price per liter of diesel for consumers is lower (higher, respectively) than that for …rms. In the temporal perspective, t=g below (above) one means that consumers'sensitivity towards the time spent on purchasing a di¤erentiated product is lower (higher, respectively) than producers'sensitivity towards the time spent on waste disposal. If a low (high) ratio t=g means that transportation cost is excessively low (high) relatively to waste cost, then …rms should give additional attention to their cost (revenue) structure as t=g ! 0 (t=g ! 1) re ‡ecting therefore …erce competition to save costs (acquire revenue, respectively). Figure 1 shows the equilibrium location of the leader, waste collection point and follower in the domain of the variable t=g. We identify a monotonic relationship between the leader's location and ratio t=g, whereas a non-monotonic relationship between the follower's location and ratio t=g is observed. Three cases should be highlighted from a static point of view. When t=g ! 0, both …rms exhibit an extremely high concern with cost reduction. Moreover, the waste collection point is located outside the residential area, which lessens the fear of social dissidence. This justi…es the birth of industrial zones in peripheral regions since the equilibrium is characterized by minimum di¤ erentiation outside consumers' residential area (a ; r ; b ) = 7 6 ; 7 6 ; 7 6 :
Locations
When t=g ! 5=27, consumers' sensitivity is still lower than …rms' sensitivity. Interestingly, the follower chooses to be positioned in a location that maximizes social welfare in standard models of location choice. The waste collection point is located close to the leader's location, but further away from the city center. The equilibrium is characterized by symmetric di¤ erentiation inside consumers' residential area. When t=g ! +1 or g=t ! 0, both …rms exhibit an extremely high concern with revenue acquisition. Consequently, the leader …rm has no incentive to move away from the city center, while the follower …rm has the incentive to be located further away from the leader's location. Firms di¤erentiate maximally such that A is located in the city center, while B is located outside the residential area to fully exploit product di¤erentiation. Moreover, the regulator is not in ‡uenced by the leader's decision since this would harm social welfare due to the decrease in consumer surplus. The equilibrium is characterized by asymmetric di¤ erentiation with the leader (follower) located in the city center (outside consumers' residential area, respectively).
(a ; r ; b ) = 1 2 ; 11 18 ; 3 2 :
Let us now focus on the evolutionary perspective of t=g. Firm A is leader in location choice, which allows it to bene…t from a …rst-mover advantage. Two conclusions should be then highlighted. First, the equilibrium location of …rm A is inversely related to t=g. Second, a permanent …xation of the leader …rm within a given city is justi…ed by the fact that t > g is frequently observed in reality (e.g., due to fuel supply discount cards for businesses). In turn, the location of the waste collection point is in ‡uenced by the …rm A's location decision. The equilibrium location of the waste facility is adaptive for t=g < 5=27, while remaining constant otherwise. The regulator installs the waste facility in a biased location outside (inside) the residential area for a su¢ ciently low (high, respectively) t=g that neither corresponds to the city center nor collapses with …rm A's location except if t=g ! 0 or t=g = 1=9. The waste collection point occupies a position to the right (left) of the city center for a < b (b < a, respectively). Accordingly, it follows that the product space of characteristics occupied by the leader outweighs (does not outweigh) the product space of characteristics occupied by the follower for a < b (b < a, respectively). Firm A is unambiguously located closer to the city center, while …rm B is located further away from the city center, though not excessively, given that only …rm B internalizes the waste cost reducing e¤ect being therefore su¢ ciently di¤erentiated from the rival, but positioned in a location su¢ ciently close to the waste collection point. This implies that …rm B replies by positioning itself in a location closer (further away) from the city center for a su¢ ciently low (high, respectively) t=g. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium price and market share of both …rms in the domain of the variable t=g. In a static perspective, the price of the leader is unambiguously higher than the price of the follower and both …rms charge above marginal cost: p A > p B > 0; 8t=g > 0: In a dynamic perspective, the price gap between …rms unambiguously increases in t=g: @ p
Prices and market shares
In fact, the price charged by the leader is twice the price charged by the follower if the relative transportation cost of consumers converges to in…nity:
B if t=g ! 1: Moreover, the leader …rm unambiguously conquers the largest market share. However, the gap between market shares is decreasing in t=g as long as the relative transportation cost of consumers is su¢ ciently weak:
B holds, 8t=g > 5=27. This suggests that the strategy pursued by the follower …rm for t=g > 5=27 (i.e., to be located further away from the leader) ensures the persistence of a niche market. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium pro…t of both …rms in the domain of the variable t=g. A …rm's pro…t increases by two means: either increasing the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation or decreasing the waste cost. In a static perspective, the pro…t of the leader is unambiguously greater than the pro…t of the follower:
Pro…ts
A > B ; 8t=g > 0: In a dynamic perspective, the pro…t gap between …rms unambiguously increases in t=g: @ In fact, the pro…t enjoyed by the leader is four times greater than the pro…t enjoyed by the follower if the relative transportation cost of consumers converges to in…nity:
Being a leader in location choice is extremely desirable under this circumstance because the price e¤ect and demand e¤ect vary positively such that the leader charges a su¢ ciently high price, while it acquires additional market share by moving towards the city center. In turn, the follower is forced to accommodate the leader's strategy by moving further away from the city center and waste facility in a location outside the residential area to continue serving a niche market, thereby ensuring no market exclusion and positive pro…t. Figure 4 clari…es that consumer surplus and social welfare are monotonic in t=g. For t=g < 5=27, the leader charges an increasing price and sustains a decreasing market share in t=g. Despite the follower holds an increasing market share, it also charges an increasing price in t=g. Since consumer surplus is negatively in ‡uenced by prices, it unambiguously decreases in t=g. Market shares remain constant, while both prices rise for t=g > 5=27. Hence, consumer surplus also decreases for this parameter space. Moreover, social welfare follows a similar pattern to consumer surplus. This is because the loss in consumer surplus unambiguously dominates the gain in producer surplus in the domain of the variable t=g: j@CS=@ (t=g)j > @P S=@ (t=g) ; 8t=g > 0: The level of social welfare for a < b is similar to that holding for b < a: If a < b becomes b < a, then the leader's product space of characteristics dominates the follower's product space of characteristics. However, this change corresponds to a neutral action on prices and market shares, which implies that producer surplus and consumer surplus remain unchanged. As a result, similar is applied to social welfare. 
Consumer surplus and social welfare
Socially optimal waste regulatory regime
Our market environment corresponds to partial ex-post regulation, while the Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015)'s market environment corresponds to ex-ante regulation. In what follows, we aim to conclude which regulatory regime is most bene…cial to society.
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Proposition 2. Ex-ante regulation is unambiguously socially desirable in the Portuguese high municipal solid waste management system. Formally
Proof. Consult the Online Appendix. Relevant conclusions can be inferred. Firstly, the transition from ex-ante regulation to partial ex-post regulation permanently harms social welfare. The reason is straightforward and summarized as follows. When the relative transportation cost of consumers is su¢ ciently high, producer surplus is unchanged. However, consumer surplus is reduced and, consequently, social welfare decreases in proportion to the reduction of consumer surplus. When the relative transportation cost of consumers is su¢ ciently low, producer and consumer surpluses are both reduced, hence, similar applies to social welfare. Secondly, there is a welfare loss in the aftermath of a regulatory policy accommodating private leadership regardless of whether consumers' transportation cost is similar to …rms'waste cost. Therefore, regulatory leadership should always be considered to avoid the undesirable e¤ect on social welfare. Thirdly, private leadership does not enhance the competitive pressure and toughness of price competition. Fourthly, the follower should always explore the informational advantage under private leadership since the correct internalization of the waste cost reducing e¤ect may improve its pro…t. Fifthly, the necessity of …nding an ideal location to waste facilities is currently a critical concern in national and transnational jurisdictions given the widespread willingness to satisfy the targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development presented by the United Nations High Level Political Forum on 18 July 2017. In the Portuguese case, the sustainable development goals number 4 (Quality Education), number 5 (Gender Equality), number 9 (Industry, Innovation and Infrastructures), number 10 (Reducing Inequalities), number 13 (Climate Action) and number 14 (Protecting Maritime Life) constitute the main national priorities. Proposition 2 reveals that ex-ante regulation corresponds to the best regulatory practice to ensure the ful…llment of target 13. The waste regulator should always be …rst-mover in long run decisions, thus, permanently anticipating …rms'strategic location or variety decisions to ensure that social welfare maximization is not compromised. If unable to do it, alternative forms of ex-ante regulation should be considered (e.g., imposition of minimum quality standards on waste treatment processes) given that a preemptive regulatory behavior is unambiguously bene…cial for society.
Finally, Proposition 2 reveals a trade-o¤ in waste regulation policy. The waste regulator ensures the highest level of social welfare if becoming …rst-mover, but from a theoretical point of view, ex-ante regulation requires to install the waste facility in the city center (Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga 2015) . Therefore, the paradox stems from the fact that a waste collection point located in the city center is rarely observable in reality, while ex-ante regulation applied to the waste industry is frequently observed as a means of ensuring the highest level of social welfare. More surprising yet, it is the delay in the regulatory decision on where to install the waste facility, which may be the result of regulatory uncertainty or inertia in the formulation of the waste policy, the driving force inducing the waste collection point to be located outside the city center. However, an intriguing observation is the recognition that the identi…ed trade-o¤ is often surpassed by the waste regulator in actual regulatory practice. Consequently, a robustness check should be provided to demonstrate that a …rst-mover regulator can maximize social welfare without necessarily imposing the city center as the optimal location of the waste facility.
Robustness
The robustness check process is developed in two separate steps. The complete analysis is relegated to the Online Appendix for the sake of brevity, but we brie ‡y summarize it here. On the one hand, we highlight the presence of a direct e¤ect under ex-ante regulation that discourages the persistence of a waste collection point in the middle of a city. This requires to provide an extensive look of additional factors (e.g., ex-ante environmental impact assessment, uncertainty, multi-criteria analysis and past experiences, heterogeneity of municipal plants) boosting the change in location of waste facilities to peripheral regions and a comprehensive review of the main appropriate methods and key economic, environmental and social aspects helping the design and selection of optimal areas for waste collection points. We conclude that all these extra attributes force the location of large waste facilities to alternative places other than the city center under ex-ante regulation. On the other hand, we emphasize the presence of an indirect e¤ect under partial ex-post regulation that reinforces the persistence of a waste collection point in a biased location relative to the city center, thus, indirectly making less likely the presence of a waste collection point in the middle of a city if there is a transition from partial ex-post regulation to ex-ante regulation. This requires to con…rm that the distortion in the optimal location of the waste collection point veri…ed under partial ex-post regulation is resilient to the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent types of waste collection facilities or, similarly, that it remains qualitatively valid when the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent types of waste collection facilities is taken into account. If that is the case, the optimal biased location with representative or homogeneous waste collection point holds generality, thereby making less likely the presence of a waste collection point in the city center under ex-ante regulation due to the transmission of the biased location veri…ed under partial ex-post regulation. Note that, in the benchmark analysis, HIGH MSWMS is treated as if holding a single representative waste collection point or, similarly, as if being composed by a set of homogenous waste collection points. However, waste collection points may be heterogeneous within a given HIGH MSWMS and each type of waste collection point may have di¤erent characteristics or distinct components across di¤erent HIGH MSWMS. This may be due to the fact that waste collection points are established in di¤erent locations, existence of di¤erent types of waste or implementation of distinct innovation processes within each HIGH MSWMS. The overall objective of this extension was reached and the methodology employed is summarized as follows. Firstly, we identify the main source of heterogeneity between the di¤erent Portuguese HIGH MSWMS by showing that the unique variable holding statistically signi…cance to explain the observed heterogeneity is the "annual variation in the amount of R&D investment". Secondly, we conclude that the observed heterogeneity between the di¤erent Portuguese HIGH MSWMS does not in ‡uence the equilibrium location of the waste facility clari…ed in Proposition 1 due to the weak and statistically insigni…cant correlation between variable "annual variation in the amount of R&D investment" and variable "distance of the di¤erent waste collection points held by each Portuguese HIGH MSWMS with respect to the city center".
14 This implies the discovery of evidence that the biased location of a representative or homogeneous waste collection point is resilient to the observed heterogeneity between di¤erent HIGH MSWMS. Consequently, the equilibrium location of a representative or homogeneous waste collection point in a country characterized by partial ex-post regulation holds generality, thereby validating that the respective biased location is applied to a broader market environment and allowing to infer that the pass through of the biased location is likely to persist when the regulatory regime moves from partial ex-post regulation to ex-ante regulation, thus, making less likely the presence of a waste facility in the city center when the welfare maximizer regulator is …rst-mover.
Conclusions
This study shows that the location of a waste collection point is not restricted to the middle of a city in a PPR system. This result is consistent with the observation of the location decisions of waste collection points in Portugal. The result emerges from the fact that a certain …rm may already be operating before the introduction of waste regulation or, alternatively, due to the anticipation of the regulatory decision on where the waste collection point is installed. This research also contributes to Industrial Organization literature, in particular to the topic of horizontal product di¤erentiation with sequential location decisions between private …rms and regulator. When a private …rm assumes the role of …rst-mover, the analysis reveals the existence of negative e¤ects on consumer surplus, producer surplus and social welfare. This …nding assumes signi…cant relevance in cities where consumers are unprotected due to legal loopholes. 15 In this sense, the aim of this research is not to propose a decision model for the location problem. Instead, we identify a potential market failure problem in policymaking. The inability to credibly commit to a location by acting as …rst-mover limits the ability of a regulator to achieve an e¢ cient geographic con…guration of the market. If location commitment is not achievable, the policymaker should consider alternative forms of ex-ante regulation to avoid perverse e¤ects on social welfare. Finally, we identify a trade-o¤ in waste regulation policy which consists of observing that the highest level of social welfare requires ex-ante regulation, but from a theoretical point of view, this regulatory regime requires the implementation of a waste collection point in the city center. We then demonstrate that a …rst-mover regulator surpasses the imminent paradox in actual regulatory practice.
Two extensions should deserve future consideration. Firstly, the introduction of incomplete information. The cost structure of a …rm is largely in ‡uenced by waste costs. Usually, a …rm is uninformed about rival's time spent on waste disposal. Imagine that a …rm has private information about its waste marginal cost. The rival internalizes the information gap, while the informed …rm internalizes the lower information observed by the rival. This requires to solve a static Bayesian game to …nd a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. In the traditional setting exposed in Tirole (1988) , we should solve a game where, say …rm B, truly knows its waste cost g; while …rm A believes that …rm B has marginal waste cost g H with probability 1 or marginal waste cost g L with probability ; g L < g H : Note that, if we assume that …rm B is …rst-mover, then it will never bene…t from the cost reducing e¤ect because the regulator is second-mover. Subsequently, follower A internalizes this outcome meaning that one expect that incomplete information may not play a signi…cant change in our main …nding. However, if we assume that follower B is third-mover, then leader A turns to be worried with the role of incomplete information. In a Bertrand game with strategic complements, incomplete information may increase (reduce) equilibrium prices if the informed …rm is high-cost (low-cost, respectively). Moreover, an increase in the probability of follower B being low-cost may reduce equilibrium prices irrespective of whether the …rm is low-cost or high-cost. Hence, incomplete information may or not be against the centripetal force described in Bárcena-Ruiz and Casado-Izaga (2015) . Secondly, the analysis of di¤erent types of regulatory behavior. In our model the regulator is second-mover, but also naive in the sense that the perverse e¤ect on social welfare is not anticipated. A sophisticated regulator may develop an adequate zoning policy to anticipate it. Finally, the present analysis relies on a rather stylized model as it has the main goal to infer the relation between ideal timing of the waste regulatory decision, optimal location of the waste facility and social welfare maximization. To meet this ob-jective in the clearest possible way, we took a partial equilibrium analysis and, consequently, a number of other relevant issues was neglected, in particular the fact that waste disposal may be subject to certain activities that may cause harsh environmental damage (e.g., illegal dumping). As such, keeping in mind the simplifying assumptions and the limitations of our approach, it seems interesting to take this concern in future research by introducing a representative variable of environmental damage in the social welfare formula. 
